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Abstract
This paper quantiﬁes the role of alternative shocks in account-
ing for the recent declines in Japanese saving rates and interest rates
and provides some projections about their future course. We con-
sider four distinct sources of variation in saving rates and real interest
rates: changes in fertility rates, changes in survival rates, changes in
technology and changes in uninsurable labor income risk. The empri-
cal relevance of these factors is explored using a computable dynamic
OLG model. We ﬁnd that the combined eﬀects of demographics and
slower total factor productivity growth successfully explain both the
levels and the magnitudes of the declines in the saving rate and the
after-tax real interest rate during the 1990s. Model simulations indi-
cate that the Japanese savings puzzle is over.
∗Corresponding author: Marshall School of Business, University of Southern California
FBE Dept. Hoﬀman Hall-701, MC-1427 701 Exposition Blvd. Ste. 701 Los Angeles,
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11 Introduction
One of the biggest distinctions between Japanese and U.S. households
is that the Japanese save more. As recently as 1990 the gap between the
personal saving rate in Japan and the United States exceeded 8 percentage
points. This gap has spawned a large body of research that has documented
these diﬀerences and tried to account for the Japanese saving puzzle (see, e.g.,
Hayashi (1997) and Horioka (1990) for reviews of this literature). Recently
this gap has been narrowing. In 2002 the gap had fallen to less than 2
percentage points, leading some to predict that the Japanese saving rate is
about to fall below the U.S. saving rate of 4 percent. Associated with this
decline in the Japanese personal saving rate has been a concurrent decline
in the after-tax real return on capital or after-tax real interest rate, from 6
percent in 1990 to 4 percent in 2000.1
This paper quantiﬁes the role of alternative shocks in accounting for the
recent declines in Japanese saving rates and interest rates and provides some
projections about their future course. We start from the life-cycle hypothe-
sis of Modigliani and Brumberg (1954). This choice is motivated by recent
ﬁndings of Hayashi (1995) and Horioka, et.al. (2000). Hayashi estimates En-
gel curves for Japanese households and ﬁnds that they are inconsistent with
the hypothesis that bequest motives are important. Horioka, et.al. (2000)
argue, more generally, that survey evidence of Japanese households is much
more consistent with the life-cycle hypothesis than the alternatives of altruis-
tic or dynastic households. Under the life-cycle hypothesis household saving
varies with age. With the further assumption of overlapping generations,
demographic changes such as the aging of a baby boom can have important
implications for saving rates. In order to measure the magnitude of these
eﬀects we assume that households live for 65 years. Households are assumed
to interact in perfectly competitive markets in a closed, general equilibrium
economy. Japan is one of the largest economies in the world both in terms of
aggregate and per capita GDP. Japan also has the smallest trade to GDP ra-
1Our measure of the after-tax real interest rate is from Hayashi and Prescott( 2000)
2tios for both goods and services in the OECD.2 For these reasons we think it
reasonable to assume that real interest rates are determined in the domestic
market in Japan.
We consider four distinct sources of variation in saving rates and real
interest rates: changes in fertility rates, changes in survival rates, changes in
technology, and changes in uninsurable labor income risk. The interaction
of fertility rates and survival rates jointly determines the age distribution of
the population at any point in time. By varying fertility rates and survival
rates, we can model the eﬀects of a baby boom and increased longevity on
the age distribution and thus on aggregate saving rates and interest rates. In
a model calibrated to Spanish data, Rios-Rull (2002) found that permanent
shocks to demographics have large eﬀects on saving and interest rates.
Changes in unemployment risk can also aﬀect saving and interest rates. In
Japan unemployment rates have risen from 2.2 percent in 1990 to 5.5 percent
in 2003. The median duration spell of unemployment has also risen from 3.5
months in 1990 to 5.5 months in 2000 and replacement rates have fallen
from 0.84 to 0.68 over the same period. From the perspective of Japanese
households this represents a big increase in unemployment risk. If this risk
is largely uninsurable then households will respond to it by increasing their
demand for savings. In addition, the general equilibrium eﬀects described in
Aiyagari (1994) imply that real interest rates will also fall.
Finally, changes in the growth rate of productivity can also have large
eﬀects on saving and interest rates. Hayashi and Prescott (2002), for instance,
have found that the the productivity slow-down in the 1990s produces big
declines in after-tax real interest rates in a representative agent real business
cycle model.
We calibrate our model to Japanese data and conduct two types of compu-
tational experiments. First, we perform a comparative steady-state analysis
with a 1990 benchmark. Our goal here is to get a preliminary assessment
of the quantitative role of one-time, permanent changes in each of the four
factors in explaining the decline in the saving rate and after-tax real interest
rate during the 1990s. Second, we conduct a dynamic analysis starting from
1990 to trace out the evolution of saving and interest rates through the mid-
dle of the current century under alternative assumptions about productivity
and fertility.
2For instance, in 2001 the trade to GDP ratio for goods was 9.3% in the U.S. and 8.4%
in Japan and the ratio of services to GDP was 2.4% and 2.3% respectively
3In Japanese data after-tax real interest rates fall by about 2 percentage
points between 1990 and 2000. Our model produces a decline of 3.8 percent-
age points in the after-tax real interest rate across steady states. This decline
can be decomposed into portions attributable to total factor productivity, un-
employment risks, fertility rates and survival rates. When we perform this
decomposition we ﬁnd that declines in the fertility rate and total factor pro-
ductivity growth have the largest eﬀects. A 1 percentage-point decline in the
fertility rate, comparable to that in the data, reduces the after-tax real inter-
est rate by about 1 percentage point. A 2 percentage-point decline in total
factor productivity growth reduces the after-tax real interest rate by more
than 2 percentage points. The magnitude of the other two factors is smaller.
An increase in unemployment risk that raises the mean unemployment rate
from 2 percent to 5 percent reduces the after-tax real interest rate by only
41 basis points. And a change in survival rates that captures the measured
increase in life expectancy between 1990 and 2000 produces a decline in the
after-tax real interest rate of only 32 basis points. The steady-state analysis
also produces a decline in the net national saving rate.
A limitation of the steady-state analysis is that it can take a long time
to transit from one steady state to another. We would really like to know
whether the factors we model can individually or jointly reproduce the mea-
sured declines in saving rates and interest rates over a ten-year period. To
address this question we conduct a dynamic analysis. We abstract from un-
employment risk because it is quantitatively small based on the steady-state
analysis. Abstracting from unemployment risk also substantially reduces the
computational burden. In computing these dynamic simulations we calibrate
the demographics to projections made by the National Institute of Popula-
tion and Social Security Research (IPSS) and posit a gradual recovery of
annual total factor productivity growth from 0.3 percent in 2000 to 2 per-
cent in 2010. Under this baseline parameterization we ﬁnd that the combined
eﬀects of demographics and slower total factor productivity growth success-
fully explain the initial levels, the year-to-year patterns, and the magnitudes
of the declines in the saving rate and the after-tax real interest rate during
the 1990s.
Given the success of the model in reproducing saving and interest rate
patterns in the 1990s it is also interesting to document the model’s projections
for the future time paths of these two variables. Our long-term simulations
indicate that the Japanese saving puzzle is over. In future years the Japanese
net national saving rate falls to 2 percent in 2010 and then gradually rises to
43.4 percent in 2024. Projections for the after-tax real interest rate suggest
that interest rates have nearly bottomed out and will gradually rise by a
total of about 25 basis points over the next twenty years. These forecasts are
predicated on a recovery in total factor productivity growth. If instead total
factor productivity growth remains low then the saving rate is projected to
fall to 0.1 percent and the after-tax real interest rate to about 1.5 percent by
2024.
Our work is related to research by Hayashi, Ito, and Slemrod (1988),
who investigate the role of imperfections in the Japanese housing market
in accounting for the Japanese saving puzzle in an overlapping generations
endowment economy. They ﬁnd that the combination of rapid economic
growth, demographics, and housing market imperfections explains the level
of Japanese saving rates in 1980. Their projections, which condition on an
unchanged real interest rate, show declines in the saving rate of about 10
percent between 2000 and 2030.
The remainder of the paper is divided into ﬁve sections. In section 2
we describe the model economy. Section 3 reports the calibration of the
model and the steady-state analysis, section 4 reports results of the dynamic
analysis and section 5 contains our conclusions.
2 Model
2.1 Demographic Structure
This economy evolves in discrete time. We will index time by t where
t ∈ {...,−2,−1,0,+1,+2,...}. Households can live at most J periods and J
cohorts of households are alive in any period t. They experience mortality
risk in each period of their lifetime.
Let µj,t denote the number of households of age j in period t. Then the






(1 + n1,t)ψ1,t 0 0 ... 0
ψ2,t 0 0 ... 0
0 ψ3,t 0 ... 0
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µt ≡ Γtµt, (1)
where µt is a J × 1 vector that describes the population of each cohort in
period t, ψj,t is the conditional probability that a household of age j − 1 in
5period t survives to period t + 1, and ψ1,t = 1 for all t. The growth rate of
the number of age-1 households between periods t and t+1 is n1,t, which we
will henceforth refer to as the net fertility rate.3 The aggregate population





The population growth rate is then given by nt = Nt+1/Nt. The uncondi-
tional probability of surviving from birth in period t − j + 1 to age j > 1 in
period t is:
πj,t = ψj,tπj−1,t−1 (3)
where π1,t−j+1 = 1 for all t.
2.2 Firm’s Problem
Firms combine capital and labor using a Cobb-Douglas constant returns





where Yt is the output which can be used either for consumption or invest-
ment, Kt is the capital stock, ht is the average eﬃciency of labor input and





t . We will assume that the the market for goods and
the markets for the two factor inputs are competitive. Then labor and capital









where rt is the rental rate on capital and wt is the wage rate.
3Note that this usage diﬀers from other common deﬁnitions of the fertility rate and
that the net fertility rate, as we have deﬁned it, can be negative, indicating a decline in the
size of the youngest cohort from one period to the next. We compute quantities analogous
to n1,t from Japanese data and use these values to parameterize our model. We use our
deﬁnition of the fertility rate to describe both the model quantities and their empirical
counterparts.
4As described below, labor eﬃciency is assumed to vary with age, so that changes in
the age distribution of the population alter the average eﬃciency of the labor force. This
eﬀect is measured by ht, while changes in eﬃciency due to technical progress are captured
by At.
62.3 Household’s Problem
All households have one adult but may have one or more children. The






where β is the preference discount rate, cj,t+j−1 is total household consump-
tion for a household of age j in period t + j − 1, and ηj is the scale of a
household of age j. This speciﬁcation of preferences makes it possible for the
size of a household to vary with the age of the adult member but imposes
the restriction that the distribution of household size, [η1,...,ηJ], remain ﬁxed
over time.
Households inelastically supply their endowment of one unit of time but
are subject to non-diversiﬁable employment risk. The employment risk fol-
lows a two-state Markov chain. This Markov chain takes on the value of
¯ s1 = 1 for employed households and ¯ s2 = 0 for unemployed households. The
transition probability matrix is given by
P =

1 − P0 P0
1 − P1 P1

(8)
where the (k,l) element of the matrix P, P(k,l), is prob(sj+1 = ¯ sl|sj = ¯ sk).
We assume a stationary process so that the unemployment rate denoted by
ν is given by ν = P0/(1+P0 −P1). Employed workers of age j receive labor
income that consists of an eﬃciency-weighted wage rate wtεj in period t,
and unemployed individuals receive unemployment beneﬁts of mwtεj. The
eﬃciency index εj is assumed to drop to zero for all j ≥ Jr, where Jr is the
retirement age. The budget constraint for a household of age j in period t
is:
cj,t + aj,t ≤ Rtaj−1,t−1 + wtεjsj + mwtεj(1 − sj) + ξt − θj,t (9)
where aj,t denotes assets held at the end of period t (with a0,t = 0 for all t),
θj,t are taxes on capital income imposed by the government, ξj,t is a lump-
sum government transfer, and Rt = rt + 1 − δ. Households are also subject
to a borrowing constraint that rules out negative holdings of assets: aj,t ≥ 0.
Taxes imposed by the government are given by
θj,t = τa(Rt − 1)aj−1,t−1 (10)
where τa is the tax rate on capital income.
72.4 Household’s Decision Rules
Suppose that a household’s asset holdings take on a ﬁnite number of values
a ∈ {0,.....,¯ a}. Then we can summarize the situation of an age-j household
in period t with the state variable xj,t. The individual state consists of asset
holdings aj−1,t−1 and employment status: xj,t = {aj−1,t−1,sj}. The period-t
wealth distribution describes the measure of households in each individual
state:λj(xj,t), j = 1,....J. Then the aggregate state of the economy, denoted
Xt, is composed of the aggregate capital stock, Kt, total factor productivity,
At, the wealth distribution, λt,and the population distribution, µt,: Xt =
{Kt,At,λt,µt}. Finally, deﬁne the government policy rule in period t as Ψt.
It will be convenient when solving the household’s problem to assume that
households know the entire future path of government policies: Ψt = {Ψi}∞
i=t
and the entire future path of total factor productivity. With these various
deﬁnitions and assumptions in hand, we can now state Bellman’s equation









cj,t + aj,t ≤ R(Xt)aj−1,t−1 + w(Xt)εjsj − θj,t + mw(Xt)εj(1 − sj) + ξt (12)
aj,t ≥ 0, cj,t ≥ 0 (13)
µt+1 = Γtµt (14)
and the law of motion of the aggregate wealth distribution and the law of mo-
tion for the aggregate capital stock given by Kt+1 = K(Xt). Since households
die at the end of period J, VJ+1,t = 0 for all t. A solution to the household’s
problem consists of a sequence of value functions: {Vj,t(xj,t;Xt,Ψt)}J
j=1 for
all t, and policy functions:{aj,t(xj,t;Xt,Ψt),cj,t(xj,t;Xt,Ψt)}J
j=1 for all t. The
law of motion for the wealth distribution is computed using forward recursion







8where the set Λj,t is {aj−1,t−1|aj,t ∈ aj,t(xj,t,Xt;Ψt)}. The recursion starts
from the initial conditions of a newly-born household with zero assets:
λ0(0, ¯ s1) =1 − ν (16)
λ0(0, ¯ s2) =ν
and otherwise λ0(·) = 0.
2.5 Government
The government raises revenue by taxing capital income at the rate τa. It
receives additional revenue by imposing a 100-percent tax on all accidental








(1 − ψj+1,t+1)R(Xt+1)aj,t(xj,t)λj(xj,t)µj,t (17)









Note that θj,t depends on xj,t since it is a function of aj−1,t−1 by (10). Total











5Our model does not explicitly include labor income taxes, consumption taxes, or
government purchases. Ignoring labor income taxes is not restrictive, given the assumption
of inelastic labor supply and the presence of lump-sum taxes or transfers. Suppose that
government purchases enter household utility functions in an additively separable way,
possibly with zero weight. Suppose in addition that these purchases are ﬁnanced entirely
by a ﬂat-rate consumption tax that is constant across the life cycle. Then in a steady
state, household asset holdings and gross-of-tax consumption expenditures at each age are
independent of the level of government purchases and the consumption tax rate. Given a
ﬁxed capital income tax rate, any variation in government purchases not ﬁnanced by the
consumption tax can be ﬁnanced only by lump-sum taxes. Any eﬀect of such taxes on
household saving would be an artifact of assumptions about how they are allocated over
the life cycle.
9Assume that government expenditure in period t equals period-t government
revenue or that the government budget constraint is balanced in each period:
Bt + Tt = Gt. Then lump-sum transfers are:





mw(Xt)εjλj(xj,t|sj = ¯ s2)µj,t)/Nt (20)
2.6 Recursive Competitive Equilibrium
Given this description of the economy we can now deﬁne a recursive
competitive equilibrium.
Deﬁnition 1: Recursive Competitive Equilibrium
Given government policy rules {Ψt}t, a law of motion for population
{Γt}t, a law of motion for unemployment P; a recursive competitive equi-
librium is a set of value functions {Vj,t(xj,t;Xt,Ψt}J
j=1 for all t, policy func-
tions {aj,t(xj,t;Xt,Ψt),cj,t(xj,t;Xt,Ψt}J
j=1 for all t, a wealth distribution λt,
factor prices {w(Xt),r(Xt)} for all t, a law of motion for aggregate capi-
tal Kt+1 = K(Xt) and a function for the average eﬃciency of labor input
ht = h(Xt) such that:
• Given the functions of factor prices {w(Xt),R(Xt)} and the law of
motion for aggregate capital K(Xt) and the function for average ef-
ﬁciency of labor input h(Xt), the set of household policy functions
{aj,t(xj,t;Xt,Ψt),cj,t(xj,t;Xt,Ψt)} solve the household’s dynamic pro-
gram (11).
• The factor prices are competitively determined so that (5) and (6) hold
and Rt = rt + 1 − δ.
• The commodity market clears:







s cj,t(xj,t;Xt,Ψt)λj(xj,t)µj,t is aggregate consump-
tion and It is aggregate investment.
10• The laws of motion for aggregate capital and the average eﬃciency of



















• The measure of households λt is generated by (15).
• The government budget constraint is satisﬁed and balanced in each
period
Bt + Tt = Gt
In section 3 we perform a comparative steady-state analysis. This analysis
is based on the notion of a stationary recursive competitive equilibrium.
Before we can deﬁne a stationary recursive competitive equilibrium we need
to deﬁne some of the building blocks.
Deﬁnition 2: Stationary population distribution
Suppose that the fertility rate and the conditional survival probabilities
are constant over time: n1,t = n1 for all t and ψj,t = ψj for all t and j.
Then a stationary population distribution, µ∗
t, satisﬁes µ∗
t+1 = Γ∗µt and
µ∗





   

(1 + n1)ψ1 0 0 ... 0
ψ2 0 0 ... 0
0 ψ3 0 ... 0
.........................
0 0 0 ψJ 0

   

A stationary population distribution has two desirable properties. First,
cohort shares in total population are constant over time: µj,t+1/Nt+1 =
µj,t/Nt for all t. Second, the aggregate population growth rate is time-
invariant: nt = Nt+1/Nt = n1 for all t. This allows us to convert the growth











11Other per-capita variables in the household budget constraint are trans-




Deﬁnition 3: Stationary recursive competitive equilibrium
Suppose the population distribution is stationary and the growth rate of
total factor productivity is constant over time: γt = γ∗ for all t. Then a
stationary recursive competitive equilibrium is a recursive competitive equi-
librium that satisﬁes:
˜ cj,t = ˜ c
∗
j, ˜ aj,t = ˜ a
∗
j
for all t and j, i.e., the factor prices are constant over time: {rt, ˜ wt} =
{r∗, ˜ w∗} for all t where ˜ w = w/A1/(1−α).
This completes the description of the model.
3 Comparative Steady-state Analysis
In this section we report results based on comparisons across steady states.
We assume that each household has one adult member. New households are
formed when individuals reach the age of 21 and households die no later than
the end of the 85th year of life. Steady-state comparisons provide a basis for
assessing the relative importance of demographics, total factor productivity,
and employment risk in the long run.
The model is calibrated to Japanese data. Following Hayashi and Prescott
(2002), the capital share parameter (α) is set to 0.36, the depreciation rate on
capital (δ) is set to 0.089, and the capital tax rate (τa) is ﬁxed at 0.48. We as-
sume further that the utility function is isoelastic: u(c) =
c1−σ
t
1−σ . We choose σ,
the risk aversion coeﬃcent, to be 2. The preference discount factor is chosen
to reproduce the 1990 Japanese after-tax real interest rate of 6%. This yields
a value of β = 0.97. The labor eﬃciency proﬁle is constructed from Japanese
data on employment, wages, and weekly hours following the methodology de-
scribed in Hansen (1993).6 Finally, the family scale is calibrated to Japanese
data following the methodology of Cubeddu and Rios-Rull (1996).
6See the data appendix for more details.
12We ﬁrst compute a steady state corresponding to 1990 values of several
crucial parameters. In particular, we assume that total factor productivity
grows at a constant rate of 2 percent per annum. The transition matrix
governing employment status is calibrated to match two data facts: the 1990
unemployment rate of 2 percent and the probability of being unemployed
one year conditional on having been employed in the previous year which
according to our calculations was 0.069 in 1990. The annual replacement rate
is calibrated to 0.842 to match the length and size of Japanese unemployment
beneﬁts. More details on the calculation of the transition probabilities and
the replacement rate can be found in the Appendix. The net fertility rate
is initially set to a baseline value of 1 percent and mortality risk for each
generation is calibrated to Japanese 1990 survival rates. Row 1 of Table 1
reports results for the baseline 1990 steady state.
Row 2 of the table shows a second, hypothetical steady state into which
the economy would settle if it were characterized by parameter values that
match important features of the Japanese economy as of 2000. This latter
calibration assumes an unemployment rate of 5 percent, a conditional prob-
ability of being unemployed one year of 0.164 and a lower replacement rate
of 0.683, total factor productivity growth of 0.29 percent, a fertility rate of
0 percent, and 2000 survival rates.7
Consider ﬁrst the interest rate implications of the model. In Japanese
data the after-tax real interest rate was 6 percent in 1990 and 3.9 percent in
2000. Comparing the ﬁrst two rows we see that the model predicts that the
after-tax interest rate would fall to a level of 2.03 percent in the new steady
state.
7For total factor productivity growth we took the average value for the 1990s. Total
factor productivity growth exhibits relatively large ﬂuctuations on an annual basis. Taking
the average value for the 1990s smooths out these ﬂuctuations.
13Table 1
Simulation (n1,ν,γ,ψ) ˆ r ˆ s
1990 baseline (.01,.02,1.02,ψ1990) 6.00% 5.32%
2000 baseline (.00,.05,1.0029,ψ2000) 2.03% 0.82%
Analysis of 2000 baseline
Low fertility rate (.00,.02,1.02,ψ1990) 4.88% 3.94%
High unemployment risk (.01,.05,1.02,ψ1990) 5.59% 5.53%
Low TFP (.01,.02,1.0029,ψ1990) 3.39% 3.02%
2000 mortality (.01,.02,1.02,ψ2000) 5.68% 5.48%
Note: ˆ r is the after-tax real interest rate, denoted by (1 − τa)(r − δ), and the ψt are
the time-t survival rates {ψj,t}J
j=1.
Rows 3 through 6 provide information on the contribution of each of the
four factors in isolation. According to these results a lower fertility rate and
lower total factor productivity growth are the biggest contributing factors. A
1 percentage-point decline in the fertility rate produces a 1.1 percentage point
decline in the real interest rate. The reason for this result can be explained
as follows. Note ﬁrst that a lower fertility rate increases the measure of
households that are close to retirement age. Since these households also have
high wealth, the low-fertility-rate wealth distribution has a higher peak than
the high-fertility-rate distribution. With a lower fraction of young workers,
aggregate labor input is also lower. Both of these eﬀects raise the capital-
output ratio and lower the after-tax interest rate.
Slower growth of total factor productivity also increases the capital-
output ratio and thus lowers the after-tax real interest rate. As Hayashi
and Prescott (2002) have previously observed, this eﬀect is quantitatively
large during the 1990s. In our simulation a 2 percentage-point decline in to-
tal factor productivity growth lowers the steady-state after-tax real interest
rate by 2.6 percentage points.
The eﬀects of higher unemployment risk and higher survival rates are
much smaller. The combined eﬀects of a higher unemployment rate, longer
durations of unemployment and lower replacement rates only reduce the
after-tax real interest rate by only 41 basis points. And higher survival
probabilities lower the after-tax real interest rate by only 32 basis points.
Consider next the model’s implications for saving rates. In Japanese data
the national saving rate was 12.8 percent in 1990 and 4.6 percent in 2000.8
8Our measure of the national saving rate is taken from Hayashi and Prescott (2002).
14The model also predicts a decline in saving, but the magnitude of the decline
is only half as big as in the data. The two biggest contributing factors are
once again lower fertility rates and lower total factor productivity growth.
Lower fertility rates contribute about 1.3 percentage points to the decline in
the saving rate and lower total factor productivity growth contributes about
2.3 percentage points. Besides understating the decline in the saving rate,
the model fails to predict its level in 1990.9
Overall, the comparative steady-state analysis ﬁnds that both demo-
graphics and total factor productivity are quantitatively important deter-
minants of real interest rates. Unemployment risk appears to be much less
important. There are several limitations of the steady-state analysis, how-
ever. The ﬁrst is timing. It is not clear whether a dynamic simulation would
produce declines of the right magnitudes over a ten-year horizon. A second
issue is that it is hard to assert that the Japanese economy was resting at
a steady state in 1990. We turn next to conduct a dynamic analysis that
addresses these limitations.
4 Dynamic Analysis
In this section we report simulation results that model the transitional
dynamics. Modeling the transition allows us to describe the full dynamic
path for equilibrium quantities and prices in response to changes in fertility
and total factor productivity. Our simulations suggest that some big changes
in saving rates are in store for the Japanese economy over the next twenty
years.
The results in Section 3 indicate that unemployment risk has only a small
eﬀect on saving and interest rates. For this reason and also to ease the
computational burden of calculating the transitional dynamics, we abstract
from unemployment risk in this section.
In order to conduct dynamic simulations it is necessary to specify the
entire future time path for the demographic variables and total factor pro-
It is the ratio of net private domestic investment plus the current account surplus to their
adjusted measure of GNP.
9We will argue below that relaxing the assumption that 1990 was a steady state, and in
particular abandoning the steady-state assumption that households were unaware of the
coming changes in demographics and productivity growth, results in a saving rate that
closely matches the observed 1990 level.
15ductivity. The demographics are pinned down by two sequences, a sequence
of net fertility rates n1,t for all future t and the sequence of age-speciﬁc sur-
vival probabilities {ψj,t}J
j=1 for all future t. Our baseline parameterization is
calculated in the following way. Considering ﬁrst the demographic variables,
for the period 1985 through 2000 we use actual data on fertility rates and
survival probabilities. These data are described in more detail in the Ap-
pendix. For the period 2000-2050, we choose these two sequences in a way
that matches the forecasts produced by the National Institute for Population
and Social Security Research (IPSS). Interestingly, we can do a good job of
reproducing their forecasts using some very simple assumptions about demo-
graphics. Figure 1 reports projections of population shares by the IPSS and
our calibrated demographic model. Our projections hold ﬁxed the {ψj,t}J
j=1
at their average value for the 1990-2000 period and set the net fertility rate
to its 2000 value of -0.1 percent. From these ﬁgures it is clear that our cali-
bration does a reasonable job of reproducing the IPSS projections. The most
notable diﬀerence is that our projections for the fraction of the population
aged 66-85 is lower than those of the IPSS from about 2020 on. For the
period beyond 2050 we continue to hold the {ψj,t}J
j=1 ﬁxed and gradually let
the fertility rate rise to zero over a 15-year period and then hold it constant
at this value thereafter. Figure 2 shows the implications of our baseline de-
mographic assumptions for the time path of total population and the time
path of fractions of diﬀerent age groups in total population. This parameter-
ization implies that the Japanese population falls by about 50 percent over
the next 100 years.
For total factor productivity we use data from Hayashi and Prescott
(2002) for the period 1985 through 2000. Between 2001 and 2010, we assume
a gradual increase in the total factor productivity growth rate to 2 percent.
Thereafter total factor productivity is assumed to grow at a constant rate of
2 percent per year.
Our dynamic analysis also requires calibration of parameters and starting
values for the initial state of the economy, which we take to be 1985. We
continue to use the calibration employed in the steady-state analysis of Sec-
tion 3, with the exception that the subjective discount factor β is adjusted
to reproduce the after-tax real interest rate in 1990. This adjustment pro-
duces a value of β = 0.985. The aggregate state vector Xt consists of the
aggregate capital stock, total factor productivity, the age distribution of the
population, and total asset holdings of each cohort. The age distribution
of the population is taken from Japanese data and total factor productivity
16from Hayashi and Prescott (2002). As we do not have Japanese data on asset
holdings by age, we take as our starting point the age-asset proﬁle from our
initial steady-state analysis, which we assume applies to 1985.
It is worth emphasizing two points about this initialization. First, it does
not matter whether the initial state vector Xt corresponds to a steady state.
Second, the steady-state analysis is only used to get a starting point for
the age-asset distribution, which is then permitted to evolve endogenously
beginning in 1985. The other elements of the initial state vector are taken
directly or indirectly from Japanese data in 1985.10
Figures 3 and 4 report our baseline results. The upper panel of each
ﬁgure shows the response of the after-tax real interest rate and the lower
panel shows the response of the national saving rate. The only diﬀerence
between Figure 3 and 4 is the dating. Figure 3 focuses on the 1990s while
Figure 4 shows long-run projections.
Consider ﬁrst the 1990s. The model successfully matches the initial level
of the after-tax interest rate and the saving rate in the data and shows de-
clines in both variables during the decade. While the model is calibrated to
match the 1990 level of the after-tax interest rate, it is not constrained to
match the saving rate. The saving pattern in our baseline dynamic analy-
sis is quite diﬀerent from the steady-state results reported in Section 3. In
the comparative steady-state analysis we found that saving rates were low
and did not vary much across steady states. The saving rate in the 1990
steady state of Table 1 is only 5.32 percent, whereas our dynamic analysis
produces a 1990 saving rate of 11.4 percent, which is close to the observed
value. This diﬀerence arises because households in the steady-state analysis
believe that the steady-state patterns of demographics and total factor pro-
ductivity growth will persist forever, whereas households at the beginning of
the dynamic analysis realize that the initial demographics and productivity
growth rate are not at their steady-state levels and will change over time. We
10Alternatively, it is possible to interpret our dynamic analysis as starting from an
initial steady state. Under this interpretation, the steady state is somewhat special in
that all economic agents believe that the prevailing age distribution of the population and
productivity growth rate will persist indeﬁnitely. Then households and ﬁrms wake up to
discover that their assumptions about future variables are wrong and instead they will be
subject to the sequence of total factor productivities and demographics described above.
The simulations then follow household responses to these sequences of exogenous variables
until the economy settles down in a new steady state. This is the same assumption made
by Rios-Rull (2002) and Nishiyama (2002).
17prefer the latter assumption both because it seems more reasonable a priori
and also because it more successfully reproduces the observed behavior of
the saving rate.
These diﬀerences in beliefs aﬀect behavior not only in 1990 but in sub-
sequent years as well. Lower predicted productivity growth and changed
demographics cause households to save more at the 1990 interest rate of 6
percent than was the case in the steady-state analysis. Over time, the higher
saving rate implies a higher capital stock and lower market interest rates.
Lower total factor productivity reinforces the decline in the interest rate.
The simulated interest rate series in Figure 3 is almost identical to the em-
pirical series through the ﬁrst half of the 1990s but is somewhat below the
actual during the second half of the decade. The simulated saving rate falls
more slowly than the actual series and takes an additional three years to
reach the values observed for 1999 and 2000. On the whole though, demo-
graphic changes and slower total factor productivity growth can account for
most of the decline in Japanese saving and interest rates during the 1990s.
Given the success of our model in reproducing the 1990s, it is also inter-
esting to explore its implications for the future. In this regard, the single
most important fact about Japanese saving in the post-World War II period
has been its magnitude. Our results indicate that the Japanese saving puzzle
is a historical artifact. The results reported in Figure 4 predict that Japan’s
net saving rate will never exceed 10 percent again. Saving rates fall to a
low of 1.5 percent in 2017 and then gradually rise to 3.1 percent by the year
2100. It is worth pointing out that this pattern is driven by persistent but
transient shocks to demographics and total factor productivity. Below, we
will show that the declines in saving and interest rates are even larger if the
shock to total factor productivity growth is assumed to be permanent.
Hayashi, et.al., (1988) also provide long-run projections for saving rates.
Their model predicts a decline in the saving rate of 10 percentage points
between 2000 and 2030. In our model the saving rate declines by roughly the
same amount. The decline in our model is concentrated in the period between
1990 and and 2010, however. Moreover, their projections are conditioned on
a very diﬀerent macroeconomic environment with a constant real interest
rate and annual growth rates of output of 4 percent per year.
The baseline results in Figure 4 suggest further that after-tax real interest
rates have temporarily bottomed out. They reach a minimum value of 3.1
percent in 2008 and then gradually rise to 3.49 percent in 2024. After that
they decline again as the shadow baby-boom generation ages. Currently it is
18estimated that Japanese life insurance companies are experiencing negative
spreads on as much as 70 percent of all outstanding life insurance policies
(see Nikkei Weekly August 25, 2003). Our projections suggest that it would
be a mistake to place a bet on signiﬁcantly higher future real interest rates.
What is the contribution of total factor productivity and demographic
factors to these results? In order to answer this question we report two other
simulations in Figure 5. In addition to reproducing our baseline results, the
ﬁgure reports results that isolate the eﬀects of demographics by holding ﬁxed
the growth rate of TFP at 2 percent in all periods. The ﬁgure also reports
results which hold the demographic pattern ﬁxed at its 1990 level and allow
TFP to vary as in the baseline parameterization. Consider ﬁrst the results
for demographics only. Abstracting from changes in total factor productivity
growth aﬀects the timing of the declines in the after-tax interest rate and the
saving rate but does not aﬀect the peak responses of these variables. The
after-tax real interest rate falls to a level of 2.9 percent in 2044 and the saving
rate falls to a minimum value of 1.5 percent in 2052.
From Figure 5 we see that declining total factor productivity by itself
produces sharp drops in the saving rate and the after-tax real interest rate
in the 1990s, but these responses damp as total factor productivity growth
returns to 2 percent in subsequent periods. The magnitude of these declines is
also quite a bit smaller than those reported in the baseline parameterization.
Here the interest rate falls from 6.7 percent in 1990 to 4.9 percent in 2000
and the saving rate falls from 6.9 percent to 3.4 percent or a total of 3.5
percentage points.
From this we see that both changing demographics and lower productivity
growth contribute to reproducing the observed decline in the interest rate
from 6 percent in 1990 to 3.6 percent by the year 2000. Lower TFP growth
has the bigger contribution during this period but appealing to both factors
is important for reproducing the measured declines in interest and saving
rates during the 1990s.
These results also indicate that observed and projected changes in fertility
rates produce very persistent responses in the saving rate and the after-tax
real interest rate. Sustained but temporary shocks to total factor produc-
tivity growth, in contrast, have large contemporaneous eﬀects but do not
produce much propagation over time in the model.
Underlying the baseline results is an assumption that the current pat-
terns of total factor productivity growth and demographics are persistent
but transient departures from their previous values. TFP gradually recovers
19to 2 percent annualized growth between 2000 and 2010 and the net fertility
rate gradually returns to zero after 2050. The results would look very dif-
ferent if the current low growth rate of TFP is assumed to be permanent.
Figure 6 reports results for a simulation in which TFP growth is assumed
to remain permanently at its 1990s average value of 0.29 percent after 2000
while the fertility rate is set to its baseline values. The assumption of per-
manently low total factor productivity growth is also maintained by Hayashi
and Prescott (2002).
Consider ﬁrst the real interest rate. This plot has three noteworthy fea-
tures. First, observe that the recovery of real interest rates after 2004 that
occurs under the baseline parameterization in Figure 6 is predicated on a
recovery of total factor productivity growth. If instead total factory produc-
tivity growth remains low, the real interest rate continues to decline until
about 2050. Second, permanently low productivity growth implies that the
bottom of the trough is much lower than under the baseline scenario. Here
the real interest rate falls to about 1 percent whereas in the baseline speciﬁ-
cation it only falls to about 2.7 percent. Third, the new steady-state interest
rate is also lower. The ﬁnal steady-state value in Figure 6 for the case of
permanently low total factor productivity growth is 1.8 percent or about 2.4
percentage points lower than the baseline speciﬁcation.
We see similar patterns in the saving rate. The decline in the saving rate is
also very large now, falling to -3.5 percent as compared to 1.5 percent for the
baseline speciﬁcation. In addition, the new steady-state saving rate is lower,
0.84 percent here as compared to 4.2 percent for the baseline speciﬁcation.
These results illustrate that our baseline assumption of a recovery in TFP
growth to 2 percent between 2001 and 2010, attenuates the downward pres-
sure on the saving rate and the interest rate coming from the aging of the
Japanese population after 2000. Instead, if total factor productivity growth
remains permanently low, saving and real interest rates experience even larger
and more persistent declines in future years. This raises an interesting ques-
tion. How strong of a recovery in TFP growth would be needed to oﬀset
the forces of an aging population on the Japanese saving rate? One answer
to this question is provided by looking at the ﬁnal steady state. If, for in-
stance, long-run if TFP growth is 15 percent per year and population growth
is zero, net investment in the ﬁnal steady state is 9.6 percent. This value of
the saving rate is close to its level in the early 1990s and much higher than
the value of 0.84 percent reported in Figure 6. However, we ﬁnd it hard to
justify steady growth of TFP at rates at such a high rate. Using our dynamic
20analysis we can also investigate what happens over shorter horizons. This
is accomplished by producing simulations in which we assume that between
2001 and 2010 TFP growth increases in a linear fashion from 0 percent per
annum to alternatively 5 percent, 10 percent and 15 percent per annum.
With a recovery to 5 percent TFP growth the saving rate remains below 5
percent until 2022. With a recovery to 10 percent TFP growth the saving
rate remains below 5 percent until 2018 and with a recovery to 15 percent
TFP growth the saving rate remains below 5 percent until 2016. Based on
these results we conclude that Japan’s saving rate will remain low for at least
the next ten years.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we have shown that the measured declines in saving rates
and real interest rates in Japan during the 1990s are consistent with the
predictions of theory. Both low total factor productivity growth and the
life cycle hypothesis play important roles in accounting for these facts. Our
theory also has sharp implications for the future evolution of saving rates
and interest rates. It provides a quantitative conﬁrmation of previous claims
that the Japanese saving puzzle is over. According to our theory, Japanese
savings rates will remain below 5 percent for the next ten years and never
again exceed 10 percent. Moreover, these projections are reasonably robust.
The population distribution, which is a key determinant of savings, changes
only gradually over time in a highly predictable way. Thus, even when we
posit a robust recovery in total factor productivity, saving rates remain low
by historical standards.
Our model could be extended in a variety of ways. It could be adapted to
examine whether the high saving rates that Japan experienced in the 1970s
can also be explained. It could be generalized to allow for a household labor
supply decision. One property of our model is that wages are rising. With
endogenous labor supply, participation rates of family members are likely to
increase. This increase in family labor supply has interesting implications for,
among other things, the sustainability of the Japanese social security system.
The model could also be adapted to include a bequest motive. Inheritance tax
rates in Japan are high and very progressive. A model with a bequest motive




Eﬃciency units by age
We construct eﬃciency units by age from time-series data that covers the
period from 1990 to 2000 following the methodology of Hansen(1993). For
each year an (11 × 2) age-sex array of data is available. Each of the 22 groups
in the array is denoted by subscript i in each year t. 11
• MEFT: Monthly contractual earnings for employed full-time wage and
salary workers
• HEPT: Hourly scheduled cash earnings for part-time wage and salary
workers
• AEFT: Annual special cash earnings for employed full-time wage and
salary workers12
• AEPT: Annual special cash earnings for employed part-time wage and
salary workers
• NFT : Number of wage and salary workers who work full-time
• NPT : Number of wage and salary workers who work part-time
• HFT : Monthly actual numebr of scheduled hours worked for employed
full-time wage and salary workers
• HPT : Daily actual number of scheduled hours worked for employed
part-time wage and salary workers
• NDPT: Monthly Actual number of days worked for employed part-
time wage and salary workers
11The data source is Basic Survey in Wage Structure by the Ministry of Health, Labor
and Welfare.
12The annual special cash earnings, AEFT and AEPT, are reported for the previous
year e.g. special cash earnings for 1990 refer to earnings received in 1989. For this reason
we treat the annual special cash earnings reported at t + 1 as those in t.
22• OHFT: Monthly actual number of overtime hours worked for employed
full-time wage and salary workers
• Age : Average age of the each age group
Following Hansen(1993), let small letters denote the real values deﬁned as
x = X/P for any nominal variable X, where P is the GDP deﬂator. From
the data series obtained in above we can construct the following series:
• weft: Average weekly earnings for employed full-time wage and salary
workers
• wept: Average weekly earnings for employed part-time wage and salary
workers
• AHFT: Average weekly hours for employed full-time wage and salary
workers
• AHPT: Average weekly hours for employed part-time wage and salary
workers
where
weft = meft/4 + aeft/48
wept = hept · HPT · NDPT/4 + aept/48
AHFT = (HFT + OHFT)/4
AHPT = HPT · NDPT/4
From these data an weekly measure of hourly earnings for each subgroup at
time t (HEit) was constructed as:
HEit =
weftit · NFTit + weptit · NPTit
AHFTit · NFTit + AHPTit · NPTit
Let HEi be the average of HEit over the t-year sample. The eﬃciency units





(NFTi + NPTi)HEi P
(NFTi + NPTi)
23where NFTi and NPTi are average over t. We next construct, , an (11 × 1
vector) of eﬃciency units by age. Each element of this vector is a weighted
average of the i’s for males and females in that age group, where the weights
are the numbers of male and female workers. From these 11 values we derive
the j for each age j = 21,...,65 using interpolation by polynomials.
Replacement rate
Our model is an annual one, whereas most of the Japanese regulations
and data relating to unemployment are categorized in terms of unemployment
duration measured in months. For example, an employed person who loses
his/her job gets at most 3 months of unemployment beneﬁts. The nominal
replacement ratio varies between 50% to 80% depending on the age and the
salary of the person as prescribed by the Social Security Law. We deﬁne the
model’s nominal replacement ratio as ¯ m = 0.65.
Deﬁne, p0 to be the probability of becoming unemployed in any month
given that one was employed the previous month and let pi be the probability
of being unemloyed at least i months, given that one has been unemployed
for at least i − 1 months. We estimate these conditional probabilities from
data on the duration of unemployment; 1 month, 1-3 month, 3-6 month, 6-12
month, 12-24 month and over 24 months using linear interpolation.13
Given the pj, let xi = Pii
j=1pj be the probability of being unemployed for
at least j months, given that an unemployment spell has begun. Thus, xi
is the probability that than an unemployment spell, once begun, will last at
least i months. Then zi = xi −xi+1 is the probability that an unemployment
spell lasts exactly i months, given that an unemployment spell has begun.
Then expected income in the ﬁrst year of unemployment is calculated
as m =
P11
j=1 zjmj + x12m12 where mj is annual income for an individual
with a duration spell of unemployment of exactly j periods. Thus a person
with a duration of unemployment spell of one month has annual income of
0.65/12+11/12 = m1 This deﬁnes the replacement ratio in our annual model.
It is 0.842 in 1990 and 0.683 in 2000.
13The data source is Report on the Special Survey of the Labor Force Survey by the
Statistics Bureau, Management and Coordination Agency, Government of Japan.
24Transition probability matrix
We model employment as a stationary, two-state, ﬁrst-order Markov pro-







1 − P0 P0
1 − P1 P1

(21)
where s1 means employed, s2 means unemployed and Prob(sk|sj) is the con-
ditional probability of being the state sk from the state sj for j,k = 1,2.
We measure P1, the probability of being unemployed this year conditional
on being unemployed last year, by Π13
j=1pj, the probability that an unem-
ployment spell, once begun, will last for at least 13 months. We use the
unemployment rate, which is given by ν = (1 − ν)P0 + νP1, to measure the
remaining transition probability P0. The transition matrices for 1990 and















The exogeneous demographic parameters consist of the initial population
distribution µ1990, the fertility rate n1,t, t = 1990,...,2000, and the condi-
tional surviving probability {ψj}J
j=1, t = 1990,...,2000. We have data on
Population and Deaths for t = 1990,...,2001 and for j = 1,...,J. 14 Note
that the model age j = 1 means age 21 and J is set to 65 in our simulations.
Then the maximum age is 85, which is the maximum available age data in
Population. This is the reason why we set J = 65.
The initial population distribution µ1990 is given by the Japanese popula-
tion distribution for 1990 in our steady-state analysis and the Japanese pop-
ulation distribution in 1985 in our dynamic analysis. The fertility rate and
the conditional surviving probability are calculated as: for t = 1985,...,2000
n1,t = (Population1,t+1 − Population1,t)/Population1,t
ψj,t = 1 − Dealthsj−1,t−1/Populationj−1,t−1
14The data source: Population is the Annual Report on Current Population Estimates
by the Ministry of Public Management, Home Aﬀairs, Posts and Telecommunications;
Deaths are the Vital Statistics by the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare.
25The other exogeneous parameters
We follow Hayashi and Prescott(2002) in calibrating the other parame-
ters with the exceptions of the time preference parameter β and the relative
risk aversion σ. The value of β is chosen to reproduce the 1990 value of the










Given data on conditional survival probabilities {ψj} we next need to
translate the economy into the economy with variables in per-capita eﬃ-
ciency units. Deﬁne a cohort share in total population by ˜ µj = µj/N. Then








j = 1 holds. 16 In a stationary equi-
librium all variables in per-capita eﬃciency units are constant over time, so
we can ignore the time subscript t. Then the transformed Bellman’s equation
is expressed as:





˜ cj + ˜ aj = R˜ aj−1/γ + ˜ wjsj − ˜ θj + m ˜ wj(1 − sj) + ˜ ξ
aj,t ≥ 0, cj,t ≥ 0
15In the steady-state analysis the value of β is set to 0.978 and in the dynamic analysis
it is set to 0.985.
16Note that we need only the conditional survival probabilities {ψj} to calculate the
stationary population distribution cohort shares. Next deﬁne µj = Π
j
i=1ψi as ψ1 = 1 and
N =
PJ
j=1 µj. Then we can calculate {˜ µ∗
j} as described above.
26where ˜ xj = {˜ aj−1,sj}, ˜ β = βγ(1−σ) and R = 1 + r − δ. Since ˜ θj = τa(R −
1)˜ aj−1/γ by (10), the budget constraint becomes:
˜ cj + ˜ aj = (1 + ˆ r)˜ aj−1/γ + ˜ wjsj + m ˜ wj(1 − sj) + ˜ ξ
where ˆ r = (1 − τa)(r − δ) is the equilibrium after-tax real interest rate.
Let 1 > 0 and 2 > 0 denote the convergence criteria for the after-
tax real interest rate and lump-sum transfers in per-capita eﬃciency units,
respectively. Computing a stationary equilibrium requires ﬁnding a ﬁxed
point in the after-tax real interest rate, ˆ r∗, and the lump-sum transfers in
per-capita eﬃciency units, ˜ ξ∗. This is accomplished in the following way.
First set the smoothing parameter ρ ∈ (0,1) and guess ˆ r0 and ˜ ξ0. Then
iterate on the following steps:




and the real wage in eﬃciency unit ˜ w0 using the ﬁrst-order condition
of the ﬁrms maximization problem.
2. Compute the decision rules {˜ aj(˜ xj),˜ cj(˜ xj)}J
j=1 by completing a back-
ward induction from the age J to the age 1 with the terminal condtion
aJ = 0, and the wealth distribution λ = {λj(˜ xj)}J
j=1 by completing a
forward recursion from the age 1 to the age J with the initial condtion
(16).
3. Compute the new capital stock in per-capita eﬃciency unit using the






s aj(˜ xj)λj(˜ xj)˜ µ∗
j/ gamma and
derive the new after-tax real interest rate, ˆ r1, from the above ˜ k us-
ing the ﬁrst-order condition of the ﬁrms proﬁt maximization problem.
Next compute the new lump-sum transfers in per-capita eﬃciency unit.
By transforming the equations (17),(18) and (20) into the per-capita
eﬃciency unit form we have
















(1 − ψj)R0˜ aj−1(˜ xj−1)λ(˜ xj−1)˜ µ
∗
j−1
17Since the subscript t is used for indicating time, we deﬁne the per capita capital income








(1 − ψj)˜ θj(˜ xj−1)λj−1(˜ xj−1)˜ µ
∗
j−1
R0 = 1 + ˆ r0/(1 − τa)
4. If |ˆ r1 − ˆ r0|/|ˆ r0| < 1 and |˜ ξ1 − ˜ ξ0|/|˜ ξ0| < 2, stop. Then we have got the
equilibrium:ˆ r∗ = ˆ r0 and ˜ ξ∗ = ˜ ξ0. If not, compute ˆ r2 = ρˆ r0 + (1 − ρ)ˆ r1
and ˜ ξ2 = ρ˜ ξ0 + (1 − ρ)˜ ξ1. Set ˆ r0 = ˆ r2 and ˜ ξ0 = ˜ ξ2, and go to step 1.
Transitional dynamics without unemployment risk
Assume that the economy starts from the period t = 1. Agents have
all the information available at the end of t = 0. The agents have perfect
foresight about the entire future paths of total factor productivity, {At}∞
t=1, of
the government policies,{Ψt}∞
t=1, and of the demographics {Γt}∞
t=1. Note that
there is no employment risk. The individual state is simply ˜ xj,t = {˜ aj−1,t−1}.
The transformed Bellman’s equation is:
Vj,t(˜ xj,t;Xt,Ψ
t)
=max{u(˜ cj,t/ηj) + ˜ βtψj+1Vj+1,t+1(˜ xj+1,t+1;Xt+1,Ψ
t)}
subject to
˜ cj,t + ˜ aj,t = Rt˜ aj−1,t−1/γt−1 + ˜ wtj − ˜ θj,t + ˜ ξt
˜ aj,t ≥ 0, ˜ cj,t ≥ 0
˜ µt+1 = µt+1/Nt+1, Nt+1 =
X
j
µt+1, µt+1 = Γtµt
and the law of motion for the per-capita-eﬃciency-unit wealth distribution,
and the law of motion for the capital stock in per-capita eﬃciency unit.
We will derive an equilibrium transition path from the initial condition to
the ﬁnal stationary equilibrium. Computing the equilibrium transition path
requires ﬁnding paths of the after-tax real interest rate, {ˆ r∗
t}∞
t=1, and of the
lump-sum transfers in per-capita eﬃciency units. {˜ ξ∗
t}∞
t=1, This is done using
the following steps. First set 1,2 > 0 and ρ ∈ (0,1).
281. Set the initial conditions {aj,0}J
j=1, γ0 and µ1. 18 Next set {γt,Ψt,Γt}∞
t=1
such that for t1 < ∞ we have {γt,Ψt,Γt} = {γt1,Ψt1,Γt1} for all t ≥ t1.
Compute the ﬁnal stationary equilibrium, ˆ r∗∗ and ˜ ξ∗∗, assuming that
{γ,Ψ,Γ} = {γt1,Ψt1,Γt1}.
2. Guess the paths of the after-tax real interest rate and the lump-sum
transfers in per-capita eﬃciency units {ˆ r0,t, ˜ ξ0,t}∞
t=1 such that {ˆ r0,t, ˜ ξ0,t}=
{ˆ r∗∗, ˜ ξ∗∗} for all t ≥ T where T is suﬃciently large that we are close to
the ﬁnal stationary equilibrium, say, T = t1 + 130.





jj and of the real wage in eﬃciency units { ˜ w0,t}T
j=1
using the ﬁrst-order condtion of the ﬁrms maximization problem.
4. Compute the decision rules of the households alive at t = 1 and derive
the path of life-time asset holdings, {aJ−i+t,t}i
t=1 for i = 1,2,..,J using
the initial conditions {aj,0}J
j=1 where i denote the maximum life-time
period left for each household alive at t = 1. Compute the decision
rules for the household born at t = 2,3,...,T and derive the path of
life-time asset holdings, {aj,j+t−1}J
j=1 for t = 2,3,...,T using the initial
asset holdings ˜ a0,t = 0 for all t.
5. Compute the capital stock in per-capita eﬃciency unit
˜ kt = PJ
j=1 ˜ at−1,j−1˜ µj−1,t−1/γt−1 and derive the new after-tax real intrest rate,ˆ r1,t
for all t = 1,2,...,T. Next compute the new lump-sum transfers in per-










t=1 |ˆ r1,t−ˆ r0,t|/|ˆ r0,t| < 1 and
PT
t=1 |˜ ξ1,t−˜ ξ0,t|/|˜ ξ0,t| < 2, stop. Then
we have got the equilibrium transition path ˆ r∗
t = ˆ r0,t and ˜ ξ∗
t = ˜ ξ0,t for
all t = 1,2,...,T. Otherwise, compute ˆ r2,t = ρˆ r0,t + (1 − ρ)ˆ r1,t and
˜ ξ2,t = ρ˜ ξ0,t+(1−ρ)˜ ξ1,t for all t = 1,2,...,T. Set ˆ r0,t = ˆ r2,t and ˜ ξ0,t = ˜ ξ2,t
for all t = 1,2,...,T and go back to step 3.
18These values are obtained directly from the data or by computing the initial stationary
equilibrium assuming some conditions.
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The evolution of the after-tax real interest rate: 1990-2140
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The evolution of private sector saving: 1990-2140
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